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Abstract 
To explore the impacts of trade credit on the pricing decisions of complementary product 
manufacturers, we establish a Bertrand model of two-echelon supply chains. Such a supply 
chain consists of two duopolistic suppliers that provide complementary products to a 
monopolistic retailer in three scenarios: 1) no supplier extends trade credit, 2) only one 
supplier extends trade credit, and 3) both suppliers extend trade credit. We find that the 
impacts of trade credit on the profit of each supply chain member are dependent on the 
difference in the opportunity cost between the upstream suppliers that extend trade credit and 
the downstream retailer. If the value is negative, one supplier will increase its profit by 
extending trade credit, thereby enhancing the profits of the other supplier and the retailer 
simultaneously. Further, if the value is negative, both suppliers adopting trade credit will 
provide more benefits to the whole supply than only single supplier adopting it. On the 
contrary, if the value is positive, no party extending trade credit will benefit all participants 
the most. 
 
Key words: supply chain management, production modeling, trade credit, complementary 
product, pricing decision 
 
1. Introduction 
Contrary to the concept of cash on delivery, which means that a buyer pays the supplier 
upon delivery of the goods, trade credit refers to the practice that the supplier credits the 
buyer a term within which to delay the payment. Although the practice of trade credit may 
seem costly for the suppliers (i.e., it may commit their capital otherwise useable for other 
businesses and exaggerate their accounts receivable), it is the largest source of external 
financing for most business-to-business firms in the United States, especially for startup and 
growing firms (Chang and Rhee, 2011). Lee and Stowe (1993) calculated the amount of trade 
credit in 1985 and concluded that lending from suppliers far exceeded the amount of loans 
from the entire banking system. Rajan and Zingales (1998) reported that accounts receivable 
and accounts payable comprised 15 and 17.8 percent of the assets in the United States, 
respectively. 
However, although it has been widely adopted, trade credit is nevertheless difficult to 
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achieve in certain instances. Suppliers and retailers have different assets and operating 
capabilities in different industries in practice. Among many differences between suppliers and 
retailers, it is particularly common for them to have different opportunity costs, which would 
directly lead to different capital borrowing costs. Under such conditions, in order to further 
improve the efficiency of the supply chain, when suppliers and retailers reach a trade credit 
agreement, they should consider the opportunity cost of trade credit, which might generate a 
series of problems and hence change the attitudes of suppliers and retailers towards trade 
credit. 
A primary problem might arise in this context is that how the difference in opportunity 
cost between suppliers and retailers would affect the implementation of trade credit. If the 
supplier provides trade credit to the retailer, the account receivables would increase 
correspondingly, which would incur borrowing costs; otherwise, the supply chain efficiency 
would not promote because retailers, especially small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), 
lack corresponding financial support. For the retailer, accessing to trade credit might further 
strengthen the desire to order more products, which might increase the efficiency of the entire 
supply chain. But the retailer also needs to consider the interest paying to the supplier and the 
profit if receives a trade credit. Therefore, it is difficult to directly judge whether suppliers or 
retailers prefer trade credit, which further increases difficulty in determining whether to adopt 
a trade credit policy. Besides, trade credit may not only have an impact on suppliers and 
retailers, but may also have an impact on their peers, especially suppliers that produce 
supplementary products. As for the parties in a supply chain, the pricing decisions of products 
might be the first and foremost question they need to consider, which could directly affect the 
benefits of all parties and efficiency of the entire supply chain. 
However, most studies address the issue that how trade credit influences the relationship 
between suppliers and buyers (Peura et al., 2015). Only a few researchers have investigated 
the horizontal role of trade credit and recognized its importance for reducing competition. 
Particular findings include that monopoly power is negatively correlated with credit provision 
(Fisman and Raturi, 2003), whilst financially stronger suppliers may be able to exclude weak 
competitors from the market through a trade credit policy (Peura et al., 2015). However, no 
study has thus far analyzed the horizontal role of trade credit on complementary products, 
which emerges when customers have to buy more than one product at the same time to ensure 
full utility (Yue et al., 2006). For example, pencils and erasers, shuttlecocks and badminton 
rackets, and cars and petrol are all complementary products. In contrast to the fact that 
suppliers that manufacture substitutable products are competitors and may lose profits from 
each other’s sales, firms benefit from increases in the sales of complementary products. 
Whether firms can raise the equilibrium price and profits over a certain supply chain by 
offering complementary products through extending trade credit remains unknown. Based on 
the above considerations, such interactions of trade credit between parties in supply chain 
producing and selling complementary products give rise to some interesting research 
questions to explore. First, what is the horizontal role of trade credit in the complementary 
product supply chain? Second, what is the mechanism by which trade credit affects pricing 
decisions? Third, how should a complementary product supply chain choose the trade credit 
policy to improve the overall efficiency of the supply chain? 
To investigate the role of trade credit in a supply chain that sells complementary products, 
 
 
we analyze a monopoly market consisting of two duopolistic suppliers that manufacture 
complementary products and sell their products to a monopolistic retailer. Both suppliers have 
the choice of extending trade credit to the retailer, although this action exposes them to an 
opportunity cost. In particular, we analyze three scenarios in which the two duopolistic 
suppliers make different decisions on whether to extend trade credit to the monopolistic 
retailer: (i) no supplier provides trade credit to the retailer, (ii) only one supplier extends trade 
credit to the retailer, and (iii) both suppliers provide trade credit to the retailer. By following 
the game-theoretical approach, the equilibrium solutions for the asymmetric setting in each 
scenario are obtained and compared. Then, by comparing the profits in these three scenarios 
under a symmetric structure, we discover novel insights into the potential impacts of trade 
credit upon the supply chain and the circumstances under which trade credit is valuable. 
Our contributions to knowledge on this topic are summarized below. 
First, regarding the equilibrium solutions under the asymmetric structure, we identify the 
optimal wholesale prices and retail prices in each scenario, showing that the impact of the 
trade credit policy on these optimal solutions is influenced by both (i) the difference between 
the interest rate that the retailer pays the suppliers and the retailer’s opportunity cost and (ii) 
the adjusted difference in the opportunity cost between the upstream suppliers that extend 
trade credit and the downstream retailer. When the interest rate is lower than the retailer’s 
opportunity cost, extending trade credit raises the wholesale price of the supplier that extends 
trade credit. Moreover, when the value of the latter factor is positive, trade credit has a 
positive effect on the wholesale price’s sensitivity to the cost of the supplier that chooses to 
provide trade credit, while it negatively affects the wholesale price’s sensitivity to the cost of 
the other supplier. 
Second, with regard to the profits of the two duopolistic suppliers and the monopolistic 
retailer in the symmetric setting, we unearth the following fact: Whether the trade credit 
policy is beneficial to each individual in a supply chain is related to the value of the adjusted 
difference in the opportunity cost between the supplier that extends trade credit and the 
retailer. When the value is positive, no party extending trade credit is the most profitable 
strategy for all members, while when the value is negative, trade credit can help increase the 
profit of all supply chain members and specifically, both suppliers adopting the trade credit 
policy simultaneously benefits each one the most. 
Third, through numerical examples, we illustrate our findings and demonstrate that both 
suppliers should always adopt a similar trade credit policy. In particular, when the adjusted 
opportunity cost difference is negative, trade credit can raise the efficiency of the entire 
supply chain, and both suppliers adopting a trade credit policy can maximize the profit of 
their own as well as the whole supply chain. However, when the adjusted opportunity cost 
difference is positive, no party will benefit from adopting the trade credit policy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. 
Section 3 describes the main problem addressed and the key notations to be utilized. Section 4 
analyses the model and details the equilibrium solutions. Section 5 compares different 
scenarios with and without trade credit and investigates their impacts upon the profits of the 
supply chain members. Numerical examples are provided in Section 6. Section 7 presents 
several extensions. Section 8 concludes this paper and discusses the future research directions. 





2. Literature review 
2.1 Literature on trade credit 
 
In recent years, trade credit as a type of loan provided by suppliers to their buyers and a 
commonly used provision in supply chain contracts has attracted considerable theoretical and 
practical research attention. On the aggregate balance sheets of non-financial U.S. businesses, 
for instance, accounts payable are three times as large as bank loans and 15 times as large as 
commercial papers (Barrot, 2016). This is despite the fact that extending trade credit exposes 
the creditor to larger default risks from their customers. This has initiated a long-standing 
discussion about the rationale behind trade credit. Early researchers pointed out that trade 
credit is mostly used by large suppliers, extending to their small customers to relieve 
downstream financial constraints. For examples, small firms use trade credit because it is hard 
for them to obtain credit from conventional financial institutions and suppliers lend to their 
customers to gain information about buyers cheaply and forge long-term relations (Schwartz, 
1974; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Biais and Gollier (1997) found that suppliers would hold 
more private information about their customers than external financial intermediaries would, 
thereby reducing their lending costs. However, studies such as Ng et al. (1999) and Klapper et 
al. (2012) concluded that small suppliers would use trade credit to assure buyers of their 
product quality. 
In recent years, researchers have examined the roles of trade credit from more specific 
aspects. Ferrando and Mulier (2013) have empirically shown the impact of trade credit on 
financing growth and found that firms would rely more on trade credit to finance growth if 
they were more vulnerable to shocks in the financial market and more likely to be financially 
constrained. Zhong and Zhou (2013) proposed a model under which the presented trade credit 
policy could increase the profitability of each member as well as the whole two-echelon 
supply chain. Jacobson and Schedvin (2015) quantified the importance of trade credit chains 
for the propagation of corporate bankruptcies and found that a customer’s failure to pay 
would expose the creditor to a larger risk of bankruptcy. Fabbri and Klapper (2009) pointed 
out that firms would be more likely to extend trade credit to their customers if they received 
credit from their own suppliers, with the strong competition in the product market 
encouraging firms to match maturity between their accounts payable and accounts receivable. 
The same authors have also investigated the relation between suppliers’ bargaining power and 
the supply of trade credit, demonstrating that suppliers with weak bargaining power compared 
with their customers would be more likely to extend trade credit as a competitive tool in the 
product market (Fabbri and Klapper, 2016). 
All these studies focus on the vertical roles of trade credit, however, little research has 
investigated the horizontal roles of trade credit in a supply chain. Our research is thus distinct 
from prior studies, as we analyze a supply chain including two duopolistic suppliers and 





2.2 Literature on pricing decisions of complementary products 
 
The literature on pricing decisions of complementary products generally reflects various 
perspectives. Some research investigates the strategy of bundling complementary products. 
For example, Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) addressed how pricing strategies for 
complements or substitutes as a bundle differ from those for independently valued products. 
Yan and Bandyopadhyay (2011) developed a profit maximization model to explore the 
optimal bundling and pricing strategies, finding that the value of a bundling strategy would 
increase along with the size of the market and price sensitivity. Zhang and Wang (2018) used 
a linear demand model estimating the demand of manufacturers and retailers to examine the 
impact of fairness concern on the three-party supply chain coordination. Li et al. (2017) 
considered a dual channel supply chain to introduce a retailer’s risk-averse behavior into the 
manufacturer’s encroachment problem under asymmetric information, focusing specifically 
on how the factors might influence the optimal pricing decisions. 
By forming a simultaneously played Bertrand model, Yue et al. (2006) investigated the 
optimal strategies for complementary firms to make pricing decisions under the assumption of 
information asymmetry, propounding that firms would obtain the highest profits if they form 
a strategic forecast information alliance and act collectively as an integrated single firm. 
Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2005) discovered that when a complementary product exists, a 
durable goods manufacturer would tend to increase the leasing prices of its product. Wei et al. 
(2013) proposed five pricing models of a supply chain with two complementary products 
manufacturers under decentralized decision-making and showed the pricing decisions with 
different market power structures among channel members. Using similar approaches, Wei et 
al. (2014) also analyzed decision on the pricing and warranty period of two complementary 
products by considering two manufacturers’ cooperation/non-cooperation strategies and also, 
the firms’ different bargaining powers. Zhao et al. (2016) studied the pricing decision of two 
complementary products in a two-level fuzzy supply chain with two manufacturers and one 
common retailer. 
Compared with the aforementioned existing studies, the main difference of our work is 
that we concentrate on the effects of trade credit regarding the pricing decisions in a 
complementary product supply chain. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not 
been appropriately addressed before. 
In summary, this paper complements the existing supply chain finance literature in three 
ways. First of all, compared to previous studies on the relationship between upstream and 
downstream members of the supply chain by trade credit, we will focus on the impact of trade 
credit on peers, specifically the suppliers of producing complementary products. Secondly, we 
study the impact of trade credit on the pricing decision of complementary products from a 
new perspective, that has not been effectively addressed yet. Finally, we not only study the 
trade credit provided by only one party in the supply chain, but also conduct a comprehensive 
and comparative study of all the parties that may provide trade credit. Table 1 summarizes the 






Table 1: Summary of the related literature and new contributions 
Reference 
The roles of trade 
credit 














Peura et al. 
(2015) 
√  √  √  
Zhong et al. 
(2013) 
√    √  
Yue et al. 
(2006) 
√   √   
Biais et al. 
(1997) 
√  √  √  
Venkatesh 
et al. (2003) 
  √ √   
Yan et al. 
(2011) 
  √ √   
Zhang et al. 
(2018) 
  √    
Lan et al. 
(2019) 
√ √    √ 
Lan et al. 
(2020) 
   √   
Li et al. 
(2017) 
   √   
Yue et al. 
(2006) 
   √   
Bhaskaran 
et al. (2005) 
   √   
Wei et al. 
(2013) 
   √  √ 
Zhao et al. 
(2016) 
   √   
This paper  √  √ √ √ 
 
 
3. Problem formulation and notations 
Consider a supply chain consisting of two large duopolistic suppliers (labelled supplier 1 
and supplier 2) and a small monopolistic retailer. The market is controlled by the two 
suppliers. Supplier 𝑖𝑖 provides product 𝑖𝑖 to the retailer at the wholesale price of 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 and the 
unit manufacturing cost of product 𝑖𝑖 is 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, and the retailer sells product 𝑖𝑖 to the consumer at 
 
 
the retail price of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. In the market, the two suppliers charge the wholesale 
price first and then the retailer decides the retail prices for the two products based on those 
wholesale prices. Both suppliers may choose to provide trade credit to the retailer, even 
though extending trade credit incurs an opportunity cost 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖, where 𝑖𝑖 =1, 2 and r, before they 
receive payment for the products. Trade credit is a kind of loan provided by the supplier, 
supplier receives interest from the retailer at the interest rate 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗, where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. The products 
that the two suppliers provide to the retailer are complementary (i.e., consumers can obtain 
the full utility only if they possess both products simultaneously). 
The consumers in the market can therefore, be divided into three segments: Segment 1 
only buys product 1, Segment 2 needs products 1 and 2, and Segment 3 buys product 2 only. 
In this model, we assume that both suppliers and the retailer are risk neutral and that there is 
no price discrimination among these three segments of consumers (Choi, 1996; 
Mukhopadhyay et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012). We also assume that market demand for both 
products is a linear function of the two retail prices (Zhu et al., 2016; Ma et al., 2018). 
Then, demand for product 1 of Segment 1 is 
 𝐷𝐷11(𝑝𝑝1) = 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝛽𝛽1𝑝𝑝1. (1) 
Similarly, demand for product 2 of Segment 3 is 
 𝐷𝐷23(𝑝𝑝2) = 𝑎𝑎2 − 𝛽𝛽2𝑝𝑝2. (2) 
The demands for products 1 and 2 of Segment 2 are respectively: 
 𝐷𝐷12(𝑝𝑝1) = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝛽𝛽11𝑝𝑝1 − 𝛽𝛽12𝑝𝑝2, (3) 
and 
 𝐷𝐷22(𝑝𝑝2) = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝛽𝛽22𝑝𝑝2 − 𝛽𝛽21𝑝𝑝1. (4) 
In the above, we assume that the parameter 𝑎𝑎1 is the primary demand for product 1 
from Segment 1 and 𝑎𝑎2 is that for product 2 from Segment 3; and that the parameter 𝑎𝑎 
refers to the primary demand for products 1 and 2 from Segment 2. The parameters 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, 
𝛽𝛽11, and  𝛽𝛽22 refer to the price sensitivities of a product’s demand to its own price, whilst 
the parameters 𝛽𝛽12 and 𝛽𝛽21 denote the cross-price sensitivities of a product’s demand to the 
price of its complementary product. We also assume that the parameters are all non-negative 
as well as that 𝛽𝛽11 is larger than 𝛽𝛽12 and that  𝛽𝛽22 is larger than 𝛽𝛽21. In other words, 
cross-price sensitivities are lower than self-price sensitivities (Wei et al., 2013; Shavandi et al., 
2015). This assumption suggests that the demand for the product is more sensitive to changes 
in its own price than to changes in the price of its complementary product. Therefore, the total 
demand for product 1 is the sum of demands for product 1 from Segments 1 and 2: 
 𝑞𝑞1 = (𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎 − (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)𝑝𝑝1 − 𝛽𝛽12𝑝𝑝2), (5) 
and the total demand for product 2 is the sum of demands for product 2 from Segments 2 and 
3: 
 𝑞𝑞2 = (𝑎𝑎2 + 𝑎𝑎 − (𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)𝑝𝑝2 − 𝛽𝛽21𝑝𝑝1). (6) 
When supplier 𝑖𝑖 asks the retailer to pay on delivery, the profit of supplier 𝑖𝑖 equals the 
product of unit profit and demand. Meanwhile, both suppliers can save an additional 
opportunity cost, that is, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 (Wu et al., 2017). Therefore, the profit of 
supplier 𝑖𝑖 that does not extend trade credit can be written as 
 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2. (7) 
By contrast, by providing trade credit, supplier 𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 1,2) is not paid immediately upon 
delivery of the products. Extending trade credit also generates an additional opportunity cost 
 
 
burden for supplier 𝑗𝑗, and the amount of this burden is related to the total manufacturing cost 
of the product, that is, 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2 (Wu et al., 2017). Therefore, the profit of supplier 𝑗𝑗 
can be given as 
 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 = ��1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗�𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 − 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 − 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2. (8) 
When no party extends trade credit, the retailer’s profit is 
 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟 = (𝑝𝑝1 − 𝑤𝑤1)𝑞𝑞1 + (𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑤𝑤2)𝑞𝑞2. (9) 
However, accepting trade credit not only generates interest, but also saves an additional 
opportunity cost, both of which are related to the total payment. Without loss of generality, we 
thus assume that when only one supplier extends trade credit to the retailer, that party is 
supplier 1. Then, the profit of the retailer is 
 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟 = [𝑝𝑝1 − (1 + 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝑤𝑤1]𝑞𝑞1 + (𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑤𝑤2)𝑞𝑞2. (10) 
When both suppliers adopt the trade credit policy, the retailer’s profit is 
 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟 = [𝑝𝑝1 − (1 + 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝑤𝑤1]𝑞𝑞1 + [𝑝𝑝2 − (1 + 𝑟𝑟2 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝑤𝑤2]𝑞𝑞2, (11) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 denotes the retailer’s opportunity cost. 
As the market is controlled by the suppliers and the firms aim to maximize their profits, 










4. Optimal solutions 
In this section, we discuss and contrast the optimal wholesale prices and retail prices in 
the three examined scenarios: 1) no supplier extends trade credit to the retailer (Case N), 2) 
only one supplier extends trade credit to the retailer (Case S), and 3) both suppliers extend 
trade credit (Case D). In each scenario, the two suppliers move simultaneously to decide their 
wholesale prices and then the retailer decides the retail prices of the complementary products. 
The goal of both suppliers and the retailer is to maximize their own profits.  
The game-theoretical approach is herein used to obtain the optimal wholesale prices and 
retail prices. In particular, the problem is solved by backwards inductions. 
 
4.1 No supplier extending trade credit (Case N) 
 
As the two duopolistic suppliers dominate the market, they announce their wholesale   
first and then the retailer decides on the price to charge for the two products. In this case, the 
equilibrium wholesale prices and retail prices are retained. 
 
Proposition 1. When no supplier extends trade credit, the duopolistic suppliers’ wholesale 









𝑝𝑝1𝑁𝑁 = 𝐴𝐴1 + 𝐴𝐴2𝑤𝑤1𝑁𝑁 + 𝐴𝐴3𝑤𝑤2𝑁𝑁,           (15) 
 
 
𝑝𝑝2𝑁𝑁 = 𝐴𝐴4 + 𝐴𝐴5𝑤𝑤2𝑁𝑁 + 𝐴𝐴6𝑤𝑤1𝑁𝑁.                       (16) 
 
where 𝐴𝐴1,𝐴𝐴2,...,𝐴𝐴6,𝐵𝐵1,𝐵𝐵2,...,𝐵𝐵6 are constants, as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 1 presents the same equilibrium solutions as the MS-Bertrand model in Wei 
et al. (2013), although the previous work did not consider a trade credit policy or the 
opportunity cost that suppliers may face. This is due to the assumption that the opportunity 
cost is linearly correlated to suppliers’ profit from the trade. 
 
4.2 Only one supplier extending trade credit (Case S) 
 
In this scenario, only one supplier provides trade credit to the monopolistic retailer. 
Without losing generality, we assume that the supplier that extends trade credit is supplier 1. 
Similar to Proposition 1, the two duopolistic suppliers and retailer make their decisions on the 
wholesale prices and retail prices sequentially based on the goal of profit maximization. The 
results are presented in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. When only one supplier extends trade credit, the duopolistic suppliers’ 









𝑝𝑝1𝑆𝑆 = 𝐴𝐴1 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝐴𝐴2𝑤𝑤1𝑆𝑆 + 𝐴𝐴3𝑤𝑤2𝑆𝑆,               (19) 
 𝑝𝑝2𝑆𝑆 = 𝐴𝐴4 + 𝐴𝐴5𝑤𝑤2𝑆𝑆 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝐴𝐴6𝑤𝑤1𝑆𝑆, (20) 
where 𝐴𝐴1,𝐴𝐴2,...,𝐴𝐴6,𝐵𝐵1,𝐵𝐵2,...,𝐵𝐵6,𝐾𝐾1 are constants, as defined in Appendix A. 
 
As 𝐵𝐵1, 𝐵𝐵2,...,𝐵𝐵6 are positive constants, intuitively, from Proposition 2, we know that the 
impact of the trade credit policy on product 1’s wholesale price is dependent on the value of 
𝐾𝐾1, which is the adjusted difference in the opportunity cost between the upstream supplier 
providing trade credit and the downstream retailer and also, on the difference between the 
interest rate 𝑟𝑟1 and the retailer’s opportunity cost 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟, while the wholesale price of product 2 
is only influenced by 𝐾𝐾1. Interestingly, we also find that in this case, the extent that trade 
credit affects the optimal solutions for both suppliers is only influenced by supplier 1’s unit 
manufacturing cost. Specifically, the higher the unit manufacturing cost of supplier 1, the 
more supplier 1’s trade credit policy affects the wholesale prices of the two products. 
To shed light on the effects of the unilateral trade credit policy, after the optimal 
wholesale and retail prices of the two complementary goods in Case S are obtained, we 
compare the results in these two cases. This results in Corollary 1 below. 
 
Corollary 1. The supplier unilaterally adopting a trade credit policy affects the wholesale 

















𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐾𝐾1 > 0,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟1 > 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟.
 (21) 













𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐾𝐾1 < 0,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟1 > 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟.
 (22) 
 𝑤𝑤2𝑆𝑆 < 𝑤𝑤2𝑁𝑁,   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐾𝐾1 > 0, (23) 
 𝑤𝑤2𝑆𝑆 > 𝑤𝑤2𝑁𝑁,   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐾𝐾1 < 0 (24) 
 
Corollary 1 shows that when supplier 1 provides trade credit, the impact on the 
wholesale prices of the two products can run in different directions, owing to the impact of 
various parameters that are case-related. Intuitively, the effect on the wholesale price of 
supplier 1 originates from two parts: (i) the relation between the interest rate that the retailer 
pays and the retailer’s opportunity cost, which affects supplier 1’s wholesale price to a greater 
extent, and (ii) 𝐾𝐾1, the adjusted difference in the opportunity cost between the upstream 
suppliers that extend trade credit and the downstream retailer, which affects the wholesale 
price’s sensitivity on cost. 
From the proof of Proposition 2 (see Appendix B), we know that when supplier 1 
extends trade credit, the impact on the retail price of product 1 from the wholesale price is 
(1 + 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟) times that in Case N. When 𝑟𝑟1 < 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ,the retailer can therefore save more 
opportunity cost than the amount used to compensate the supplier, thus raising the retailer’s 
profit. Hence, the supplier who lends to the retailer is encouraged to charge a higher 
wholesale price to share the profit. However, 𝑐𝑐1 >
2(1+𝑟𝑟1)(𝑟𝑟1−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)(𝐵𝐵1𝐵𝐵5−𝐵𝐵3𝐵𝐵4)
𝐵𝐵2𝐵𝐵5𝐾𝐾1
 which means that 
𝑤𝑤1𝑆𝑆 is smaller than 𝑤𝑤1𝑁𝑁. Although supplier 1 wants to share the profit from the retailer by 
charging a higher wholesale price, this profit is not sufficient to compensate for the losses 
incurred by the reduced demand, and supplier 1 must therefore charge a lower wholesale price 
to generate a profit. By contrast, when 𝑟𝑟1 > 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟, the retailer’s profit decreases to some extent, 
thereby reducing the amount that retailer is willing to pay the supplier, this leads to the 
equilibrium wholesale price dropping. However,𝑐𝑐1 >
2(1+𝑟𝑟1)(𝑟𝑟1−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)(𝐵𝐵1𝐵𝐵5−𝐵𝐵3𝐵𝐵4)
𝐵𝐵2𝐵𝐵5𝐾𝐾1
 which implies 
that 𝑤𝑤1𝑆𝑆 is larger than 𝑤𝑤1𝑁𝑁. With an increasing cost, the suppliers have to charge a higher 
wholesale price to prevent a loss. 
Note that 𝐾𝐾1 plays a role in making supplier 1’s wholesale price more or less sensitive 
to its unit manufacturing cost, because the opportunity cost is the function of the 
manufacturing cost. That 𝐾𝐾1 > 0 means that with the availability of trade credit, supplier 1’s 
opportunity cost is greater than the retailer’s. As such, the loss that supplier 1 incurs is greater 
than the retailer’s profit and cannot be compensated by the interest that the retailer pays, 
prompting supplier 1 to charge a higher price. Therefore, when 𝐾𝐾1 > 0, supplier 1 solely 
extending trade credit raises product 1’s wholesale price closer to its unit manufacturing cost. 
However, when 𝐾𝐾1 < 0, as the retailer’s opportunity cost is high, the interest that the retailer 
 
 
pays is sufficient to offset the supplier’s loss, meaning that the supplier is willing to lower its 
charge, thus adversely affecting product 1’s wholesale price’s sensitivity to its cost. 
By comparison, as supplier 2 requires the retailer to pay on delivery, it does not receive 
the interest paid by the retailer, and thus, it is not influenced by 𝑟𝑟1  and 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟  directly. 
Interestingly, although the two products are complementary, the impact of 𝐾𝐾1  on the 
sensitivity to cost of the two products’ wholesale prices is reversed because a positive 𝐾𝐾1 
increases the sensitivity of product 1’s wholesale price to its cost. This also raises the retail 
price, thereby reducing equilibrium demand for product 1. As product 2 is the complementary 
product, decreasing demand for product 1 also lowers demand for product 2. Hence, supplier 
2 and the retailer have to drop their prices to stimulate market demand for product 2.Similarly 
to this analysis, when 𝐾𝐾1 < 0, extending trade credit increases supplier 2’s wholesale price. 
In contrast to Proposition 1, as supplier 1 extends trade credit, the sensitivity of the 
optimal retail price to product 2’s wholesale price is unchanged, whereas that to product 1’s 
wholesale price is altered. Comparing the retail prices in these two cases leads to the 
following Corollary 2. 
 
Corollary 2. That a supplier unilaterally adopts a trade credit policy affects the retail prices of 
the products of both suppliers, as follows: 
 𝑝𝑝1𝑆𝑆 > 𝑝𝑝1𝑁𝑁 ,   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐾𝐾1 > 0, (25) 
 𝑝𝑝1𝑆𝑆 < 𝑝𝑝1𝑁𝑁 ,   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐾𝐾1 < 0. (26) 
 𝑝𝑝2𝑆𝑆 > 𝑝𝑝2𝑁𝑁 ,   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝐾𝐾1(𝐴𝐴5𝐵𝐵6 − 𝐴𝐴6𝐵𝐵5) > 0, (27) 
 𝑝𝑝2𝑆𝑆 < 𝑝𝑝2𝑁𝑁 ,   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝐾𝐾1(𝐴𝐴5𝐵𝐵6 − 𝐴𝐴6𝐵𝐵5) < 0. (28) 
 
Corollary 2 suggests that the impact of trade credit on the retail price of product 1 in 
these scenarios is only related to the value of 𝐾𝐾1. As the retail price is positively correlated 
with the wholesale prices of both products, when a supplier unilaterally extends trade credit, 
the impact of the changed sensitivity to product 1’s wholesale price is offset by the changed 
wholesale price resulting from the interest rate and opportunity cost. Thus, the impact of trade 
credit on product 1’s retail price only originates from the changed cost sensitivity of the 
wholesale prices. Further, because only supplier 1 adopts the trade credit policy, its effect on 
the wholesale price’s cost sensitivity is greater than that of supplier 2. Given that supplier 1’s 
wholesale price affects more on its own retail price than the complementary product’s 
wholesale price does, the effect of trade credit on product 1’s retail price is consistent with the 
impact on its own wholesale price from 𝐾𝐾1. Therefore, when 𝐾𝐾1 > 0, trade credit raises the 
retail price, but when 𝐾𝐾1 < 0, the retail price falls. Nonetheless, product 2’s retail price is 
more affected by its own wholesale price and supplier 1’s trade credit policy influences 
supplier 2’s wholesale price to a less extent than its own. 
 
4.3 Both suppliers extending trade credit (Case D) 
 
Similarly, using a game-theoretical approach, the wholesale prices and retail prices of the 
two products in case D can be derived as given in Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3. When both suppliers extend trade credit, the optimal wholesale prices 𝑤𝑤1𝐷𝐷 ,𝑤𝑤2𝐷𝐷 
 
 









𝑝𝑝1𝐷𝐷 = 𝐴𝐴1 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝐴𝐴2𝑤𝑤1𝐷𝐷 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟2 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝐴𝐴3𝑤𝑤2𝐷𝐷, (31) 
  𝑝𝑝2𝐷𝐷 = 𝐴𝐴4 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟2 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝐴𝐴5𝑤𝑤2𝐷𝐷 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝐴𝐴6𝑤𝑤1𝐷𝐷, (32) 
where 𝐴𝐴1,𝐴𝐴2,...,𝐴𝐴6,𝐵𝐵1,𝐵𝐵2,...,𝐵𝐵6,𝐾𝐾1,𝐾𝐾2 are constants, as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Similar to Proposition 2, the wholesale prices of both products are more affected by the 
relation between the individual interest rate that the retailer pays and the retailer’s opportunity 
cost. Owing to the complexity of this case, the effect of the trade credit policy is difficult to 
obtain. In particular, the manufacturing costs of both suppliers play a part in this case, with 
the extent dependent on the values of both 𝐾𝐾1 and 𝐾𝐾2. The numerical examples shown in 
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 compare the optimal wholesale prices in the three cases, where the default 
values of the parameters involved are: 𝛽𝛽11 = 0.5,𝛽𝛽22 = 0.4,𝛽𝛽1 = 0.45,𝛽𝛽2 = 0.35,𝛽𝛽21 =
0.3,𝛽𝛽12 = 0.25,𝑎𝑎 = 100,𝑎𝑎1 = 100,𝑎𝑎2 = 80, 𝑐𝑐1 = 30, 𝑐𝑐2 = 25, 𝑟𝑟1 = 0.04, 𝑟𝑟2 = 0.04, 𝐼𝐼1 =
0.13, 𝐼𝐼2 = 0.08. 
 
These two figures jointly reveal that when the trade credit policy is adopted, both 
suppliers’ equilibrium wholesale prices increase with the retailer’s opportunity cost. However, 
the wholesale prices under the trade credit policy do not always increase or decrease as 
compared to those achievable when no party extends trade credit. Specifically, for supplier 1, 
when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 is small, extending trade credit reduces both products’ wholesale prices, and the two 
suppliers offering credit simultaneously drag the prices down further. This finding can be 
explained as that as the retailer’s profit falls with a low opportunity cost, the amount that the 
retailer can accept to pay the supplier also drops and the equilibrium wholesale price 
decreases. However, when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 reaches a certain value, extending trade credit saves more 
opportunity cost and thus generates more profit for retailer 1, raising the equilibrium 
wholesale prices that the retailer pays the suppliers. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 also illustrate that the 
impact of trade credit on product 2’s wholesale price reveals the same trend as that on product 
1. As these two products are complementary, demands for both products should change in the 




Fig. 1. Effect of 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 on product 1’s wholesale prices in all three cases 
 
Fig. 2. Effect of 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 on product 2’s wholesale prices in all three cases 
 
Proposition 3 shows that when both suppliers adopt a trade credit policy, the equilibrium 
retail price of each product is affected by the relation between the interest rate and the 
retailer’s opportunity cost, 𝐾𝐾1 and 𝐾𝐾2, with the solutions dependent upon different factors. 
Thus, it is difficult to compare the solutions in Case D with those in Case N or Case S directly. 
 
 
However, as with Corollary 2, the impact on both products’ retail prices only originates from 
the wholesale prices’ changed cost sensitivity of the two products. 
The numerical examples in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 illustrate that both suppliers providing trade 
credit affects the wholesale prices and retail prices of both products. The default parameter 
values are the same as those given in Proposition 3. 
Figs. 3 and 4 show that the impacts of trade credit on the two products’ retail prices with 
respect to 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 are different. For product 1, the retail price with trade credit decreases with 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟, and 
when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 is sufficiently large, extending trade credit decreases product 1’s retail price. This 
may be attributed to the fact that a higher value of 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 means that the retailer can save a larger 
amount of the opportunity cost when trade credit is provided, thus augmenting its total profit. 
As a result, the retailer is more motivated to decrease its price to stimulate demand. 
Meanwhile, when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 reaches a certain value, the retail price of product 1 in Case D is higher 
than it is in Case S because both suppliers extending trade credit to the retailer overstates the 
retailer’s emphasis to repay the loan from those upstream creditors, and the retailer thus has to 
raise the retail price to maintain its revenue. 
 
 




Fig. 4. Effect of 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 on product 2’s retail prices in all three cases 
 
However, the case differs for product 2, whose retail price increases along with 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 in 
Case S whilst decreasing with 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 in Case D. Further, when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 is small, supplier 1 solely 
extending trade credit reduces product 2’s retail price. Yet, when the two suppliers adopt trade 
credit simultaneously, this raises product 2’s retail price, and when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 reaches a certain value, 
the impact on retail prices is reversed. 
 
5. Comparisons and managerial implications 
In this section, we compare the profits of the two duopolistic suppliers and monopolistic 
retailer in the aforementioned three scenarios to determine the circumstances under which 
trade credit is the most valuable to each firm. We also examine the impacts of selected 
parameters on the value of trade credit to identify managerial implications. The parameters in 
all three scenarios are assumed to be symmetric in order to simplify the case, avoiding 
possible problems caused by asymmetry. This follows the work by Tsay and Agrawal (2000) 
and Mishra and Raghunathan (2004), that is, 𝑎𝑎1 = 𝑎𝑎2, 𝛽𝛽1 = 𝛽𝛽2 , 𝛽𝛽11 = 𝛽𝛽22 , 𝛽𝛽12 = 𝛽𝛽21 , 
𝑐𝑐1 = 𝑐𝑐2, 𝐼𝐼1 = 𝐼𝐼2, 𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑟𝑟2, and 𝐾𝐾1 = 𝐾𝐾2. To facilitate comparisons, we set 𝛼𝛼 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎1 =
𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎2 , 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11 = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22 , 𝜆𝜆 = 𝛽𝛽12 = 𝛽𝛽21 , 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐1 = 𝑐𝑐2 , 𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼1 = 𝐼𝐼2  and 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑟𝑟2. In such a symmetric structure, 𝐾𝐾1 = 𝐾𝐾2, and we set this to K. 
 
Theorem 1. Under different circumstances, the impact of the trade credit policy on supply 
chain parties’ profits is illustrated as follows: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 < 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁,         𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝐾𝐾 > 0,   
 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁 < 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 ,         𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝐾𝐾 < 0,    
where i=1, 2, and r. 
 
Theorem 1 indicates that the profitability of extending trade credit is not definitely 
positive to supply chain parties. Instead, it is related to the value of K, which is the adjusted 
difference between the opportunity cost of the upstream supplier with the trade credit policy 
and that of the downstream retailer. And the profits of the three supply chain participants 
show the same trend in all three cases. 
Firstly, with respect to supplier 1, when K is positive, extending trade credit to the 
retailer reduces supplier 1’s profit, and supplier 1 loses even more when it promotes a trade 
credit policy with supplier 2 simultaneously. However, when K is negative, extending trade 
credit can increase supplier 1’s profit, and the trade credit policy shows to be more 
worthwhile when the two suppliers adopt it simultaneously. Specifically, compared with when 
no party extends trade credit, when K is positive, supplier 1 extending trade credit raises the 
retail prices of both products, thus triggering a large decrease in demand for its own product. 
Meanwhile, as supplier 1’s opportunity cost also relates to the product quantity, the decreased 
demand raises the opportunity cost burden for supplier 1 markedly as well. Thus, although 
supplier 1 can increase the wholesale price it charges the retailer by adopting a trade credit 
policy, the trade credit effect is so weak that the corresponding profit rise owing to the hike in 
wholesale prices cannot cover the profit decline brought about by the reduced demand. 
Similarly, both suppliers adopting trade credit simultaneously causes a stronger effect on 
demand than on wholesale price resulting in a profit decrease. Conversely, when K is negative, 
supplier 1 allowing trade credit reduces (raise) the retail price of product 1 (2), causing a 
substantial expansion in demand for its own product. Thus, although the trade credit policy 
decreases the wholesale price, the profit increase due to the growing demand outweighs the 
loss from the lower wholesale price and the opportunity cost, and supplier 1’s profit increases 
ultimately. 
Secondly, with respect to supplier 2, when 𝐾𝐾 > 0, no party extending trade credit 
benefits supplier 2 the most; on the contrary, when 𝐾𝐾 < 0, supplier 2 can maximize its profit 
by providing trade credit alongside supplier 1 simultaneously. Specifically, when 𝐾𝐾 > 0, 
supplier 1 unilaterally extending trade credit cuts the wholesale price of product 2 according 
to Corollary 1. Meanwhile, supplier 1’s behaviour is to raise its retail price to a much greater 
extent and, as the two products are complementary, product 1’s highly increased retail price 
also decreases supplier 2’s demand, resulting in a lower profit for supplier 2. Similarly, when 
𝐾𝐾 < 0, supplier 1 providing credit to the retailer can enhance both the demand and the 
wholesale price of supplier 2, raising its profit. In the symmetric setting, the impact of both 
suppliers extending trade credit on supplier 2 is the same as that on supplier 1. With a positive 
K, the possible profit generated by the wholesale price increase is insufficient to cover the loss 
from the fall in demand. By contrast, when K is negative, the demand expansion contributes 
more to increasing profit than the lower wholesale price does to reducing the profit. 
Finally, with respect to retailer’s attitude toward trade credit, the impact of the trade 
credit policy on the profits of the retailer shows the same trend as on the suppliers’ profits; in 
other words, the trade credit policy is advantageous only when K is negative. Further, 
although the retailer can accept the trade credit policy from upstream suppliers only passively, 
 
 
when the two suppliers adopt the same policy, it always benefits the retailer the most. 
Specifically, when K is positive, although supplier 1 extending trade credit increases the retail 
price of product 1, the demand decreases significantly as price increases, which reduces the 
retailer’s unit profit of product 1. Also, the raised retail price decreases demand for product 2 
due to their complementary nature. At the same time, although product 2’s unit profit 
increases as compared to Case N, as mentioned above, the demand decreases because of 
product 1’s increased retail price, which shrinks the retailer’s profit. On the contrary, the 
retailer’s profit rises when K is negative. In Case D, with a positive K, both products’ unit 
profit and demand fall, causing the retailer’s profit to drop below that achievable in both Case 
N and Case S. The opposite holds when K is negative. 
In summary, it can be derived that when 𝐾𝐾 > 0, implementing a trade credit policy 
decreases the profits of both duopolistic suppliers as well as the monopolistic retailer; on the 
contrary, when 𝐾𝐾 < 0, the two duopolistic suppliers extending trade credit simultaneously 
augment the profit of the entire supply chain. Furthermore, to maximize the profitability of 
every supply chain member, the two suppliers should always adopt the same trade credit 
strategy. Specifically, when 𝐾𝐾 > 0, no party extending trade credit is more profitable, while 
when 𝐾𝐾 < 0, the optimal strategy is for both suppliers to adopt the trade credit policy. 
 
6. Numerical examples 
To illustrate the impact of trade credit on the efficiency of the supply chain, we provide 
numerical examples in this section to (i) compare the profits of the two suppliers with that of 
the retailer in the two scenarios, and to (ii) present the optimal trade credit policy based on the 
different opportunity costs of the suppliers and the retailer. 
 
6.1 Comparison between cases 
 
In this subsection, to explain the results we have obtained and show the effect of 
retailer’s opportunity cost on supply chain members’ profit, we consider illustrative example 
as shown in Fig. 5, where the default parameters values are empirically set to 𝛼𝛼 = 180,𝛽𝛽 =
0.7, 𝜆𝜆 = 0.3, 𝑐𝑐 = 30, 𝐼𝐼 = 0.1 and 𝑟𝑟 = 0.05. Fig. 5 presents the comparisons among the 
three cases. The setting of the parameter values consists with production practice and satisfies 
the assumptions made in Section 3, such as the condition that the realized demand is always 
nonnegative. 
Fig. 5 depicts the profit changes of the two suppliers and the retailer with 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 in Case N, 
Case S and Case D, showing that when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 reaches the value that reduces K below 0, the 
profits of all supply chain members in Case S are higher than those in Case N while lower 
than those in Case D and that they increase with the value of 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟. These results suggest that 
when K is negative, both suppliers extending trade credit can raise the profits of all supply 
chain members while increasing the efficiency of the entire supply chain most, and the profit 
of parties will increase as 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 continues to increase. On the contrary, when K is positive, this 
behaviour will reduce the profit of every supply chain member more than that of only one 




With respect to suppliers, with a negative K, we find: 1) when no trade credit is provided, 
the profits of the suppliers are constant; 2) in the case of the two suppliers extending trade 
credit simultaneously both suppliers and the retailer are more profitable than that of only one 
supplier doing so; 3) at the same time, as the other party producing complementary products, 
supplier without providing trade credit only benefits from a quite small portion of the profits 
from trade credit policy. However, when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 reaches the value that makes K positive, any 
supplier's provision of trade credit will lead to a reduction in its own profits, which in turn 
will bring about a decrease in the efficiency of the supply chain. In other words, when one 
supplier adopts the trade credit policy, the other one behaving similarly would cause all 
members of the chain to suffer a loss. With respect to the retailer, when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 is above the 
threshold, either or all of suppliers extending trade credit can benefit not only themselves, but 
also the retailer, whereas a positive K reduces the profits of all supply chain members and thus 
supply chain efficiency. 
 
Fig. 5. Effect of 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 on three supply chain member’s profits in three cases 
 
6.2 Trade credit strategy preference 
 
In this subsection, we present the optimal trade credit strategy involving different 
opportunity costs for suppliers and the retailer, where the default parameters values are 
𝛼𝛼 = 180,𝛽𝛽 = 0.7, 𝜆𝜆 = 0.3,  𝑐𝑐 = 30, and 𝑟𝑟 = 0.05. The result is shown in Fig. 6, reflecting 
that the suppliers’ and retailer’s opportunity costs influence the choice of trade credit strategy. 
In this figure, the “Case D zone” denotes the area in which the two suppliers extending trade 
credit simultaneously is the most profitable strategy, and the “Case N zone” denotes the area 
in which the supply chain is the most efficient when no party extends trade credit. This figure 
also illustrates that the case of only one supplier allowing trade credit is never the best choice 
for the supply chain. Further, with the suppliers’ opportunity cost fixed, the higher the 
retailer’s opportunity cost, the greater the profit when both suppliers extend trade credit. On 
the contrary, when the retailer’s opportunity cost is fixed, the effect of no party adopting the 





Fig. 6. Trade credit strategy preference 
 
7. Extensions 
In this section, we first consider the opportunity cost of the retailer in the previously 
identified three scenarios and then, set the model parameters differently from those given in 
Section 5 in an effort to draw new conclusions regarding the performance of the suppliers and 
retailer. Further, we calculate the profits of both suppliers and the retailer when the product 
costs are no longer equal (i.e., 𝑐𝑐1 ≠ 𝑐𝑐2). 
To enable this comparative study, in Section 7.1, we simplify the parameters in the three 
scenarios by making them all symmetric, which consistent with the parameters in Section 5. 
We then explore the impact of the suppliers having asymmetric costs in Section 7.2. As 
reflected by the results that follow, our main conclusions are qualitatively unchanged. 
 
7.1 Impact of trade credit policy with opportunity costs of both retailer and suppliers 
 
In this subsection, considering opportunity costs of both the retailer and the two 
suppliers, we adopt a new profit function and compare all parties’ profits in the three cases, in 
order to determine find the optimal trade credit strategy.  
Here, for the retailer, when no party extends trade credit, its profit is 
              𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟 = (𝑝𝑝1 − 𝑤𝑤1)𝑞𝑞1 + (𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑤𝑤2)𝑞𝑞2 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟(𝑤𝑤1𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑤𝑤2𝑞𝑞2).             (36) 
When only one supplier extends trade credit, we assume that it is supplier 1. The profit 
of the retailer can be given as 
              𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟 = [𝑝𝑝1 − (1 + 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝑤𝑤1]𝑞𝑞1 + (𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑤𝑤2)𝑞𝑞2 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤2𝑞𝑞2.           (37) 
When both suppliers adopt the trade credit policy, the retailer’s profit is 




Theorem 2. Considering opportunity costs of all parties, the impact of the trade credit policy 
on supplier 1’s profit is given as follows: 
𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 < 𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (0,𝑀𝑀1) ∪ (𝑀𝑀3, 1) ∩ (0,𝑀𝑀2), 
𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁 < 𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀3) ∩ (𝑀𝑀2, 1). 
where 𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀2,𝑀𝑀3 are constants, as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Theorem 2 is basically the same as that presented earlier; however, when supplier 1 
provides trade credit to the retailer, the supplier’s profit is only related to cost c and there are 
no additional conditions of 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 for this result. In other words, when the cost is within a certain 
range, it is always beneficial for the suppliers to provide trade credit when taking the 
opportunity cost of the retailer into consideration. In particular, if 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀3) ∩ (𝑀𝑀2, +∞), 
extending trade credit to the retailer raises supplier 1’s profit. Supplier 1 will earn even more 
profit when supplier 2 provides trade credit simultaneously. When 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟  is in the 
complementary area, the opposite is true. 
When 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (0,𝑀𝑀1) ∪ (𝑀𝑀3, +∞) ∩ (0,𝑀𝑀2), supplier 1 extending trade credit will cause a loss. 
The rising retail prices of both products dramatically decrease the product’s demand. 
Although this lower demand can reduce the opportunity costs, the effect is too weak to 
compensate for the profit decline driven by the reduced demand, causing the profit to drop 
ultimately. Conversely, the effect of trade credit allows demand to surge to a high level, and 
the resulting consequent profit increase compensates for the loss from the lower wholesale 
price. 
 
Theorem 3. Considering opportunity costs of all parties, the impact of the trade credit policy 
on supplier 2’s profit is given as follows: 
𝜋𝜋2𝐷𝐷 < 𝜋𝜋2𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀4) ∩ (0,𝑀𝑀5),   
𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁 < 𝜋𝜋2𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋2𝐷𝐷, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (0,𝑀𝑀1) ∪ (𝑀𝑀4, 1) ∩ (𝑀𝑀5, 1),        
where 𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀4,𝑀𝑀5 are constants as specified in Appendix A. 
 
Theorem 3 guarantees the same result for profit as Theorem 2. Just as indicated by 
Theorem 1, when  𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀4) ∩ (0,𝑀𝑀5), no party extending trade credit benefits supplier 2. 
However, when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (0,𝑀𝑀1) ∪ (𝑀𝑀4, +∞) ∩ (𝑀𝑀5, +∞) , supplier 2’s profit decreases by 
adopting the trade credit policy alongside supplier 1 simultaneously.  
Specifically, Theorem 3 shows that supplier 2’s profit decreases as supplier 1 provides 
trade credit. As the two products are complementary, supplier 1 providing trade credit reduces 
demand for the complementary products, resulting in a lower profit for supplier 2. Yet, 
compared with Case D, when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀4) ∩ (0,𝑀𝑀5), if supplier 2 also adopts the trade 
credit policy, both products’ retail prices rise and thus, its demand shrinks substantially, 
thereby decreasing the profit to a larger extent. On the contrary, when 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 is in the opposite 
area, both product 1 and product 2 have lower prices and the decrease in both products’ retail 
prices triggers product 2’s demand, which help raise supplier 2’s profit. 
 
Theorem 4. Considering opportunity costs of all parties, the impact of the trade credit policy 
on retailer’s profit is as follows: 
 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷 < 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (0,𝑀𝑀6) ∪ (𝑀𝑀1, 1), 
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 < 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷 , 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (𝑀𝑀7,𝑀𝑀1), 
where 𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀6,𝑀𝑀7 are constants, as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Theorem 4 indicates that the impact of the trade credit policy on the profits of the retailer 
shows the same trend as that for the suppliers’ profits. When 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (𝑀𝑀7,𝑀𝑀1), the retailers 
receiving trade credit from the suppliers will increase its profit, and this rise becomes even 
larger when both suppliers offer trade credit. 
When 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (0,𝑀𝑀6) ∪ (𝑀𝑀1, +∞), although supplier 1 providing trade credit increases the 
retail price of product 1 (i.e., the retailer’s unit profit will rise), demand for product 1 falls 
simultaneously. At the same time, as suppliers 1 and 2 provide complementary products, the 
increase in the price of product 1 leads to the decline in the price of product 2, which reduces 
the retailer’s revenue further. 
 
7.2 Impact of trade credit policy on profits of suppliers and retailer with asymmetric costs 
 
In this subsection, we extend the parameters setting to a more general, and demonstrate 
the credit policy impact of all parties having asymmetric costs (i.e., 𝑐𝑐1 ≠ 𝑐𝑐2). Moreover, we 
also explore the specific impact of the retailer by assigning specific values to the parameters 
and drawing a figure.  
Theorem 5. Under asymmetric costs setting, the impact of the trade credit policy on supplier 
1’s profit is illustrated as follows: 
𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 < 𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐1 ∈ (𝐺𝐺1,𝐺𝐺2) ∩ (𝐺𝐺3,𝐺𝐺4), 
𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 > 𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 > 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐1 ∈ (0,𝐺𝐺1) ∪ (𝐺𝐺2,𝐺𝐺4) ∩ (0,𝐺𝐺3), 
where 𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀6,𝑀𝑀7 are constants (defined in Appendix A). 
 
Theorem 5 shows that in an asymmetric cost setting, the participant’s profit is only related 
to the relationship between cost 1 and cost 2. Specifically, comparing Case N with Case S, we 
find that the difference in their profit functions is a quadratic equation, which is related to 𝑐𝑐1. 
If 𝑐𝑐1 ∈ (𝐺𝐺1,𝐺𝐺2), 𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁  and if 𝑐𝑐1 ∈ (0,𝐺𝐺1) ∪ (𝐺𝐺2,𝐺𝐺4), 𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 > 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁 . However, comparing 
the results on Case S with Case D shows that the difference between the two profit functions 
is a linear function of 𝑐𝑐1 . Further, if 𝑐𝑐1 > 𝐺𝐺3 , 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 < 𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆  and if 0 < 𝑐𝑐1 < 𝐺𝐺3 , 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 > 𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 . 
Hence, compared with the extension described in Section 7.1, the establishment of Theorem 5 
requires a significantly less number of conditions (e.g., without involving the opportunity cost 
and interest rate). 
 
Theorem 6. Under asymmetric costs setting, the impact of the trade credit policy on supplier 
2’s profit is given as follows: 









Theorem 6 shows the same conclusion as that drawn in Section 7.1. This limits the range 
 
 
of values for the retailer’s opportunity cost. Indeed, the condition for the establishment of 




�, trade credit being provided by supplier 1 decreases the demand of 
supplier 2 and thus reduces supplier 2’s profit. This effect is more serious in Case D where we 
have 𝜋𝜋2𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁. When  𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ �
(1+𝑟𝑟)(1+𝐼𝐼)
2
, 1�, the provision of trade credit by supplier 1 has a 
positive impact on supplier 2 and this effect is more pronounced in Case D, which 
means 𝜋𝜋2𝑆𝑆 > 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁. However, at the same time, the comparison between Case S and Case D is 
done without involving any conditions other than the cost. Note that the cost function similar 
to Theorem 5 is a linear function about itself and the difference is a quadratic function. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Effect of 𝑐𝑐1 on the retailer’s profits in the three cases 
 
By comparing the retailer’s profits under three scenarios, we found that the core 
conclusions have not changed. The impact of the trade credit policy on the profits of the 
retailer shows the same trend as that on supplier 1’s profits. Indeed, all the comparison results 
were established without a constraint, and like Theorem 5, there were few similar restrictions. 
We provide a numerical example to describe the comparison of retailer's profits more 
intuitively, where the default parameter values of parameters are 𝑎𝑎 = 180,𝛽𝛽 = 0.7,𝜆𝜆 =
0.3, 𝐼𝐼 = 0.1, 𝑟𝑟 = 0.05, 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 = 0.1. 
Fig. 7 depicts the profit changes of the retailer with 𝑐𝑐1 in three cases. When 𝑐𝑐1 is small, 
supplier 1 increases the price of product 1 to share the profit from the provision of trade credit. 
This leads to a decrease in demand of its product as well as a reduction in demand for product 
2, leading to a lower profit margin for the retailer. This way of raising prices causes a further 
decline in the retailer’s profits in Case D, with 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷 < 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁. Therefore, as 𝑐𝑐1 increases, 
the profit of retailer in case D exhibits a faster downward trend than that in case N. However, 
although the cost increase will reduce the demand, the increased retail price can compensate 
for this part of the loss for the retailer’s profit in Case S. As 𝑐𝑐1 rises further, the result is the 





















opposite, namely 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 < 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷. 
8. Conclusion 
We have analyzed the pricing decisions in a supply chain that consists of two duopolistic 
suppliers who manufacture complementary products and a common monopolistic retailer 
under different scenarios in which both suppliers have the right to decide whether to extend 
trade credit to the retailer. A number of results have been established: First, three Bertrand 
models having been formulated respectively regarding the cases where: (i) no supplier adopts 
the trade credit policy, (ii) only one supplier extends trade credit, and (iii) both suppliers 
extend trade credit. Second, the optimal equilibrium wholesale prices and retail prices of the 
two complementary products in each of these scenarios have been identified and their 
differences compared. Third, given the assumption that these two complementary products 
are symmetric, the three firms’ equilibrium profits in various situations have also been 
compared with the optimal strategy under such circumstances derived.  
Based on our analysis, several interesting interpretations and managerial implications are 
obtained. First, it has revealed that the equilibrium solutions with the trade credit policy are 
affected by both the difference between the interest rate that the retailer pays the creditor and 
the retailer’s opportunity cost, as well as the adjusted difference in the opportunity cost 
between the creditor and retailer. Furthermore, product cost has been verified to affect the 
pricing strategies of the parties in such a supply chain with trade credit in addition to those 
differences of both interest rate and opportunity cost. Moreover, with respect to whether 
suppliers should extend trade credit, we find that the difference in the opportunity cost has a 
consistent effect on whether parties in the supply chain adopt trade credit. In other words, 
when the value of K is negative, both suppliers and retailers can benefit from the trade credit 
policy, and their profits increase with the number of suppliers that provide trade credit; 
Otherwise, forego trade credit is their best strategy.  More concretely, in the symmetric case, 
this investigation has concluded that when the adjusted difference in the opportunity cost 
between the upstream and downstream actors is positive, the trade credit policy reduces the 
profits of all participants, whereas all members of the supply chain will benefit from the trade 
credit policy when the opportunity cost is negative. Furthermore, by comparing scenarios 
supported with numerical examples, this research has verified that to maximize the profit of 
all members and the efficiency of the entire supply chain, the two suppliers should always 
adopt the same trade credit strategy.  
Our results are based on a series of assumptions, which deserve further examination. 
First, we have only analyzed supplier-controlled markets while establishing a Bertrand model. 
Dealing with the cases of a retailer-controlled market and two suppliers moving sequentially 
may generate different results from our study. Second, we have assumed that the opportunity 
cost holds a linear relationship with a firm’s profit. Further research could extend this setting 
to include a non-linear function of opportunity cost. Moreover, currently, demand has also 
been assumed to be linear without considering other factors that may influence it. This forms 
another aspect that could be further discussed in future research. Finally, when comparing the 
profits of the three parties in the various scenarios investigated, the two suppliers have been 
assumed to be symmetric. Yet, asymmetric situations may be more realistic in real-world 
problems, albeit addressing such situations may require much more challenging extensions. 
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Appendix A. Notations 
𝐴𝐴1 =
(𝛽𝛽12+𝛽𝛽21)(𝑎𝑎2 + 𝑎𝑎) − 2(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)(𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎)
(𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽21)2 − 4(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)
 
𝐴𝐴2 =
(𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽21)𝛽𝛽12 − 2(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)
(𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽21)2 − 4(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)
 
𝐴𝐴3 =
(𝛽𝛽12 − 𝛽𝛽21)(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)
(𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽21)2 − 4(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)
 
𝐴𝐴4 =
(𝛽𝛽12+𝛽𝛽21)(𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎) − 2(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)(𝑎𝑎2 + 𝑎𝑎)
(𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽21)2 − 4(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)
 
𝐴𝐴5 =
(𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽21)𝛽𝛽21 − 2(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)
(𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽21)2 − 4(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)
 
𝐴𝐴6 =
(𝛽𝛽21 − 𝛽𝛽12)(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)
(𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽21)2 − 4(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)
 
𝐵𝐵1 = 𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎 − (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)𝐴𝐴1 − 𝛽𝛽12𝐴𝐴4 + (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)𝑐𝑐1𝐴𝐴2 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑐𝑐1𝐴𝐴6 
𝐵𝐵2 = 2(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)𝐴𝐴2 + 2𝛽𝛽12𝐴𝐴6 
𝐵𝐵3 = (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)𝐴𝐴3 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐴𝐴5 
𝐵𝐵4 = 𝑎𝑎2 + 𝑎𝑎 − (𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)𝐴𝐴4 − 𝛽𝛽21𝐴𝐴1 + (𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)𝑐𝑐2𝐴𝐴5 + 𝛽𝛽21𝑐𝑐2𝐴𝐴3 
𝐵𝐵5 = 2(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)𝐴𝐴5 + 2𝛽𝛽21𝐴𝐴3 
𝐵𝐵6 = (𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)𝐴𝐴6 + 𝛽𝛽21𝐴𝐴2 
𝐾𝐾1 = 𝐼𝐼1(1 + 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟) − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 
𝐾𝐾2 = 𝐼𝐼2(1 + 𝑟𝑟2 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟) − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 
𝑅𝑅 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟) 
𝐾𝐾 = 𝐼𝐼(1 + 𝑟𝑟 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟) − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 
𝑀𝑀1 =
𝐼𝐼(1 + 𝑟𝑟)
2 + 𝐼𝐼 + 𝑟𝑟
 
𝑀𝑀2 =
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)(2𝐼𝐼 − 1)
1 + 2𝐼𝐼 + 𝑟𝑟
 
𝑀𝑀3 =
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)(8𝛽𝛽2 − 4𝜆𝜆2 − 𝐼𝐼𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆 + 3𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆)
𝐼𝐼𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆(1 + 𝑟𝑟) + 𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝑟𝑟) + 8𝛽𝛽2 − 4𝜆𝜆2
 
𝑀𝑀4 =
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)(4𝛽𝛽2 + 2𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆 + 𝐼𝐼𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆 − 2𝜆𝜆2)
2𝜆𝜆2(1 + 𝑟𝑟) + (𝐼𝐼 − 𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆 − 4(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽2
 
𝑀𝑀5 =
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)[(1 − 𝐼𝐼)𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆(𝜆𝜆2 − 2𝛽𝛽2) + 𝛽𝛽2𝜆𝜆2(4 + 2𝐼𝐼 + 4𝑟𝑟 − 3𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)− 𝑟𝑟(4𝛽𝛽4 − 𝜆𝜆4) +𝐻𝐻1]
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)(1 + 𝑟𝑟 + 2𝐼𝐼)(𝜆𝜆4 + 4𝛽𝛽4) + (1 − 𝐼𝐼)(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆(2𝜆𝜆2 − 4𝛽𝛽2)−𝐻𝐻2
 
𝑀𝑀6 =
(2 + 𝐼𝐼)𝛽𝛽(4𝛽𝛽2 − 3𝜆𝜆2) + 2𝜆𝜆3
(𝐼𝐼 − 𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽(4𝛽𝛽2 − 3𝜆𝜆2) − 2𝜆𝜆3(1 + 𝑟𝑟)
 
𝑀𝑀7 =
(1 + 𝑟𝑟)(2 + 2𝐼𝐼)𝜆𝜆3 + (1 + 𝑟𝑟)(2 + 𝐼𝐼)𝛽𝛽(4𝛽𝛽2 − 3𝜆𝜆2)
2(1 + 𝐼𝐼)𝜆𝜆3 + (𝐼𝐼 − 𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽(4𝛽𝛽2 − 3𝜆𝜆2)
 
𝐻𝐻1 = �(2 + 𝑟𝑟)2(𝛽𝛽 + 𝜆𝜆)2(2𝛽𝛽 − 𝜆𝜆)2(3𝜆𝜆2𝛽𝛽2 + 2𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆3 − 4𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽3 − 4𝛽𝛽2 − 𝜆𝜆4) 





















2𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽2 + 2𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆2 + 𝛽𝛽2𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐2 + 4𝐼𝐼𝛽𝛽2 − 2𝐼𝐼𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆 − 𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆
β(2𝛽𝛽2 − 𝜆𝜆2)
 
𝐸𝐸1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐼𝐼(𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐2 + 2𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆 − 2𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽 + 𝑎𝑎𝜆𝜆 + 4𝛽𝛽) 
𝐸𝐸2 = 𝐼𝐼(2𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 − 𝐼𝐼 − 2𝑟𝑟 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 − 2)(2𝛽𝛽2 − 𝜆𝜆2) 
𝐸𝐸3 = (𝑅𝑅 + 𝐼𝐼 + 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)(𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐2 + 𝑎𝑎𝜆𝜆 − 2𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽) + 2𝜆𝜆(1 + 𝑟𝑟)(𝐼𝐼 − 1) − 4𝐼𝐼(𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 + 2𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅) 
𝐸𝐸4 = 𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐2(2𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼 − 3 − 3𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟) + 2𝜆𝜆(1 + 𝑟𝑟)(𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 − 1 − 𝐼𝐼 − 𝑎𝑎) 
 
Appendix B. Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1. 




= 𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎 − 2(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)𝑝𝑝1 − (𝛽𝛽12+𝛽𝛽21)𝑝𝑝2 + (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11)𝑤𝑤1 + 𝛽𝛽21𝑤𝑤2, (b1) 
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2)
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝2
= 𝑎𝑎2 + 𝑎𝑎 − 2(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)𝑝𝑝2 − (𝛽𝛽12+𝛽𝛽21)𝑝𝑝1 + (𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22)𝑤𝑤2 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑤𝑤1. (b2) 
Then, we compute the second-order derivatives of Eqs. (b1) and (b2) to obtain th










= −2(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22). (b3) 
Thus, from Eq. (b3), we conclude that the determinant of the Hessian matrix is positive. 
Therefore, 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2) is jointly concave in 𝑝𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝2. Setting Eqs. (b1) and (b2) equal to 
zero and solving them simultaneously, we obtain the optimal prices of the two products in 
Case N: 
 𝑝𝑝1𝑁𝑁(𝑤𝑤1,𝑤𝑤2) = 𝐴𝐴1 + 𝐴𝐴2𝑤𝑤1 + 𝐴𝐴3𝑤𝑤2, (b4) 
 𝑝𝑝2𝑁𝑁(𝑤𝑤1,𝑤𝑤2) = 𝐴𝐴4 + 𝐴𝐴5𝑤𝑤2 + 𝐴𝐴6𝑤𝑤1, (b5) 
where 𝐴𝐴1, 𝐴𝐴2,…,𝐴𝐴6 are constants. 
From Eqs. (11) and (12), the first-order partial derivatives of 𝜋𝜋1  to 𝑤𝑤1  and the 
first-order partial derivatives of 𝜋𝜋2 to 𝑤𝑤2 are 
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤1
= (𝐵𝐵1 − 𝐵𝐵2𝑤𝑤1 − 𝐵𝐵3𝑤𝑤2)(1 + 𝐼𝐼1). (b6) 
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋2
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
= (𝐵𝐵4 − 𝐵𝐵5𝑤𝑤2 − 𝐵𝐵6𝑤𝑤1)(1 + 𝐼𝐼2). (b7) 








= −𝐵𝐵5(1 + 𝐼𝐼2). (b9) 
 
 
From Eqs. (b8) and (b9), we know that 𝜋𝜋1  and 𝜋𝜋2  are concave in 𝑤𝑤1  and 𝑤𝑤2 , 
respectively. Thus, by setting Eqs. (b6) and (b7) equal to zero and solving them 
simultaneously, Proposition 1 is proven. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. By substituting Eqs. (14) and (15) into Eqs. (b4) and (b5), 
Proposition 2 is obtained. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 1. 












    Under the assumption that the self-price sensitivities are greater than the cross-price 
sensitivities and that all the parameters are positive, we can verify that 𝐵𝐵1, 𝐵𝐵2,...,𝐵𝐵6 are all 
positive constants and 𝐵𝐵2 − 𝐵𝐵3 > 0 , 𝐵𝐵5 − 𝐵𝐵6 > 0 . Thus, from Eqs. (b10) and (b11), 
Corollary 1 is obtained. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2. 
    Comparing the retail prices of the two products in the three cases, the following 
relationships are obtained: 








Under the assumption that the self-price sensitivities are greater than the cross-price 
sensitivities, 𝐵𝐵1, 𝐵𝐵2,...,𝐵𝐵6 are all proven to be positive constants and𝐵𝐵5 − 𝐵𝐵6 > 0. Thus, 
from Eqs. (b12) and (b13), Corollary 2 is obtained. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1. 
Given symmetric structure of the case with the following setting:𝛼𝛼 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎1 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎2, 
𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽11 = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22 , 𝜆𝜆 = 𝛽𝛽12 = 𝛽𝛽21 , 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐1 = 𝑐𝑐2 , 𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼1 = 𝐼𝐼2  and 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑟𝑟2 , we 
compute the difference in supplier 1’s profit between Case N and Case S such that 





[(4𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾 + 1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽4 − 𝐾𝐾(4𝐾𝐾 + 5𝑟𝑟 + 5)𝛽𝛽2𝜆𝜆2 +
𝐾𝐾(1 + 𝑟𝑟 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝜆𝜆4]𝑐𝑐2 + [4𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽2𝜆𝜆 − 2𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆2]𝑐𝑐 − 4𝛼𝛼2𝐾𝐾(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽2 +
4𝛼𝛼2𝐾𝐾(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆 − 𝛼𝛼2𝐾𝐾(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝜆𝜆2.  (b14) 
which is a one-variable quadratic polynomial about c. Under the assumption that the 
self-price sensitivity is larger than the cross-price sensitivity, we know that 4𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾 + 1 +
𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽4 + 𝐾𝐾(4𝐾𝐾 + 5𝑟𝑟 + 5)𝛽𝛽2𝜆𝜆2 − 𝐾𝐾(1 + 𝑟𝑟 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝜆𝜆4 > 0 when 𝐾𝐾 > 0 and 4𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾 + 1 +
𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽4 + 𝐾𝐾(4𝐾𝐾 + 5𝑟𝑟 + 5)𝛽𝛽2𝜆𝜆2 − 𝐾𝐾(1 + 𝑟𝑟 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝜆𝜆4 < 0 when 𝐾𝐾 < 0. 
 
 
Then, we calculate the Δ of the divisor of Eq. (b14): 
 𝛥𝛥 = 4𝛼𝛼2𝐾𝐾2(2𝛽𝛽 − 𝜆𝜆)2(2𝛽𝛽2 − 𝜆𝜆2)2(1 + 𝑟𝑟)(𝐾𝐾 + 1 + 𝑟𝑟), (b15) 
which is positive. Thus, both Δ and the coefficient of the quadratic term of the divisor of Eq. 
(b14) are positive. With the restriction that 𝑐𝑐 > 0 and the dividend of Eq. (b14) is positive, 
the following holds: 
When 𝐾𝐾 > 0, 




When 𝐾𝐾 < 0, 




Similarly, we compute supplier 1’s profit changes in Case D and compare that with Case 
N and Case S. As 𝛽𝛽 > 2𝜆𝜆 and all the parameters are positive, we have: 
When 𝐾𝐾 > 0, 





,   (b18) 
and  




When 𝐾𝐾 < 0, 





 , (b20) 
and  




To ensure the model is realistic and meaningful, we need to guarantee that the demand 
level in each scenario is positive. Then, we obtain the following limitations: 
When 𝐾𝐾 > 0, 
 𝑞𝑞 > 0   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝑐𝑐 < 𝛼𝛼(1+𝑟𝑟)
(𝛽𝛽+𝜆𝜆)(𝐷𝐷+1+𝑟𝑟)
, (b22) 
When 𝐾𝐾 < 0, 
 𝑞𝑞 > 0   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝑐𝑐 < 𝛼𝛼(1+𝑟𝑟)(2𝛽𝛽−𝜆𝜆)(1+𝑟𝑟)(2𝛽𝛽2+𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆−𝜆𝜆2)+𝐾𝐾𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆. (b23) 
 
Using Eqs. (b16)–(b23), Theorem 1 is proven. 
 
Proof of Theorem 2. 
As we consider the symmetric structure of the case and set 𝛼𝛼 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎1 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎2, 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽1 +
𝛽𝛽11 = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22, 𝜆𝜆 = 𝛽𝛽12 = 𝛽𝛽21 , 𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼1 = 𝐼𝐼2 , 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑟𝑟2 , and 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐1 = 𝑐𝑐2 , we compute 
the difference in supplier 1’s profit between Case S and Case D: 






𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝐼𝐼){𝛽𝛽[𝑟𝑟(𝐼𝐼 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟) + 𝐼𝐼 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟(2 + 𝐼𝐼)][4(1 + 𝑟𝑟)(𝐼𝐼 − 1)𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 +
 
 
2(1 + 𝐼𝐼) + 2𝛼𝛼(𝐼𝐼 − 1)] + 2(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐼𝐼(8𝛽𝛽2 − 4𝜆𝜆2)(1 + 𝑟𝑟 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟) + 2(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽[(3 − 𝐼𝐼)𝑟𝑟 +
𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝐼𝐼)𝑟𝑟 + 3 − 𝐼𝐼 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟(1 + 𝐼𝐼)]}c +
𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽(1+𝐼𝐼)(1+𝑟𝑟)𝐼𝐼{(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝐼𝐼−1)𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽+𝜆𝜆(1+𝑟𝑟)[1+𝐼𝐼+𝛼𝛼(1−𝐼𝐼)]}
(2𝛽𝛽−𝜆𝜆)2(2𝛽𝛽+𝜆𝜆)2(1+𝑟𝑟)(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)
   (b24) 
Which is a one-variable quadratic polynomial about c. Under the assumption that the 
self-price sensitivity is larger than the cross-price sensitivity, we find that the coefficient of 







         (b25) 




,        (b26) 
which is positive. With the restriction that 𝑐𝑐 > 0 and 0 < 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 < 1, we find that: 
When 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝜖𝜖(𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀3), 
𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 > 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷， if 𝑐𝑐 >
2𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼)+𝜆𝜆(1+𝛼𝛼)(1+𝑟𝑟+𝐼𝐼+𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)
(8𝛽𝛽2−4𝜆𝜆2)(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)+(𝐼𝐼+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝜆𝜆2𝛽𝛽2
        (b27) 
When 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝜖𝜖(0,𝑀𝑀1)∪ (𝑀𝑀3, 1), 
𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 > 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷， if 0 < 𝑐𝑐 <
2𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼)+𝜆𝜆(1+𝛼𝛼)(1+𝑟𝑟+𝐼𝐼+𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)
(8𝛽𝛽2−4𝜆𝜆2)(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)+(𝐼𝐼+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝜆𝜆2𝛽𝛽2
       (b28) 
Similarly, we compute supplier 1’s profit changes in Case N and compare that with Case D 
and Case S. As 𝛽𝛽 > 2𝜆𝜆 and all the parameters are positive, we have: 
When 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (0,𝑀𝑀2), 
 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁 > 𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆,   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝑐𝑐 >
2𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆2(1+𝐼𝐼−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)
𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)+𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆2(𝐼𝐼+𝑟𝑟+𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)+(1+𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽
,   (b29) 
and  




When 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (𝑀𝑀2, 1), 
 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁 > 𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆,   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  0 < 𝑐𝑐 <
2𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆2(1+𝐼𝐼−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)
𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)+𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆2(𝐼𝐼+𝑟𝑟+𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)+(1+𝑟𝑟)𝛽𝛽
 , (b31) 
and  




To ensure the model is realistic and meaningful, we need to guarantee that the demand 
level in each scenario is positive. Then, we obtain the following limitations: 
When 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (0,𝑀𝑀1) ∪ (𝑀𝑀3, 1) ∩ (0,𝑀𝑀2), 
 𝑞𝑞 > 0   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝑐𝑐 < 𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽+2𝐼𝐼(𝛽𝛽+𝜆𝜆)
(1+𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)(𝛽𝛽+𝜆𝜆)
, (b33) 
When 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 ∈ (𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀3) ∩ (𝑀𝑀2, 1), 




Using Eqs. (b23)–(b34), Theorem 4 is proven. 
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2. 
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2. 
 
 
Proof of Theorem 5. 
As we consider the symmetric structure of the case and set 𝛼𝛼 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎1 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎2, 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽1 +
𝛽𝛽11 = 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽22, 𝜆𝜆 = 𝛽𝛽12 = 𝛽𝛽21, 𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼1 = 𝐼𝐼2, 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑟𝑟2, but set 𝑐𝑐1 ≠ 𝑐𝑐2, we compute the 
difference in supplier 1’s profit between Case S and Case D: 
𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 − 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 =
𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽2𝐼𝐼[(1+𝐼𝐼)(1+𝑟𝑟)−2𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟]𝑐𝑐2−2(1+𝑟𝑟)(1+𝐼𝐼)
4(1+𝑟𝑟)(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)(2𝛽𝛽−𝜆𝜆)2(2𝛽𝛽+𝜆𝜆)2
{−4(2𝛽𝛽2 − 𝜆𝜆2)(1 + 𝑟𝑟 − 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)𝑐𝑐1 + 𝜆𝜆[(1 + 𝑟𝑟)(𝐼𝐼 −
3) + 2𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟]𝑐𝑐2 + 4𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝐼𝐼)(1 + 𝑟𝑟) − 2𝜆𝜆(1 + 𝑟𝑟)(1 + 𝛼𝛼)(𝐼𝐼 − 1)]}      (b35) 
Which is a one-variable linear polynomial about 𝑐𝑐1. With the restriction that 𝑐𝑐 > 0, we find 
that: 
𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 > 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷， if 𝑐𝑐1 >
𝑐𝑐2[2𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟+(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝐼𝐼−3)]𝛽𝛽+2(1+𝑟𝑟)[𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎−1)−(1+𝑎𝑎)]
(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)(8𝛽𝛽2−4𝜆𝜆2)
      (b36) 
and 
𝜋𝜋1𝑆𝑆 < 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷， if 0 < 𝑐𝑐1 <
𝑐𝑐2[2𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟+(1+𝑟𝑟)(𝐼𝐼−3)]𝛽𝛽+2(1+𝑟𝑟)[𝐼𝐼(𝑎𝑎−1)−(1+𝑎𝑎)]
(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)(8𝛽𝛽2−4𝜆𝜆2)
     (b37) 
Similarly, we compute supplier 1’s profit changes in Case N and compare that with Case D 
and Case S. As 𝛽𝛽 > 2𝜆𝜆 and all the parameters are positive, we have: 










)         (b38) 
𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷 > 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐1  >
𝑐𝑐2𝛽𝛽[(1+𝑟𝑟)𝐼𝐼+2𝑟𝑟+2]+𝛼𝛼(1+𝑟𝑟+𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)(𝑎𝑎−1−𝐼𝐼)
2𝜆𝜆2𝛽𝛽4(1+𝑟𝑟)(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)
       (b39) 
and 










, +∞)       (b40) 
𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁 > 𝜋𝜋1𝐷𝐷, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐1  <
𝑐𝑐2𝛽𝛽[(1+𝑟𝑟)𝐼𝐼+2𝑟𝑟+2]+𝛼𝛼(1+𝑟𝑟+𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)(𝑎𝑎−1−𝐼𝐼)
2𝜆𝜆2𝛽𝛽4(1+𝑟𝑟)(1+𝑟𝑟−𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟)
       (b41) 
To ensure the model is realistic and meaningful, we need to guarantee that the demand 
level in each scenario is positive. Then, we obtain the following limitations: 
 𝑞𝑞 > 0   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝑐𝑐 < 2𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽
2+2𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆2+𝛽𝛽2𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐2+4𝐼𝐼𝛽𝛽2−2𝐼𝐼𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆−𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆
β(2𝛽𝛽2−𝜆𝜆2)
,    (b42) 
 
Using Eqs. (b35)–(b42), Theorem 5 is proven. 
Proof of Theorem 6. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5. 
 
References 
Barrot, J. (2016). Trade credit and industry dynamics: Evidence from trucking firms. Journal 
of Finance, 71(5): 1975–2015. 
Bhaskaran, S.R., & Gilbert, S.M. (2005). Selling and leasing strategies for durable goods with 
complementary products. Management Science 51(8): 1278–1290. 
Biais, B., & Gollier, C. (1997). Trade credit and credit rationing. Review of Financial Studies 
10(4): 903–937. 
Chang, H.L., & Rhee, B.D. (2011). Trade credit for supply chain coordination. European 
 
 
Journal of Operational Research 214(1): 136–146. 
Choi, S.C. (1996). Price competition in a duopoly common retailer channel. Journal of 
Retailing 72(2): 117–134. 
Fabbri, D., & Klapper, L.F. (2009). Trade credit and the supply chain. Faculteit Economie en 
Bedrijfskunde, Amsterdam. 
Fabbri, D., & Klapper, L.F. (2016). Bargaining power and trade credit. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 41: 66–80. 
Feng, J., Lan, Y., Zhao, R. (2017). Impact of price cap regulation on supply chain contracting 
between two monopolists，Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization 13(1): 
347–371. 
Ferrando, A., & Mulier, K. (2013). Do firms use the trade credit channel to manage growth? 
Journal of Banking & Finance 37(8): 3035–3046. 
Fisman, R., & Raturi, M. (2003). Does competition encourage credit provision? Evidence 
from African trade credit relationships. Review of Economics & Statistics 86(1): 345–352. 
Jacobson, T., & Schedvin, E.V. (2015). Trade credit and the propagation of corporate failure: 
An empirical analysis. Econometrica 83(4): 1315–1371. 
Klapper, L., Laeven, L., & Rajan, R. (2012). Trade credit contracts. Review of Financial 
Studies 25(3): 838–867. 
Lan, Y., Cai, X., Shang, C., Zhang, L., & Zhao, R. (2020). Heterogeneous suppliers’ contract 
design in assembly systems with asymmetric information. European Journal of 
Operational Research 286(1): 149–163. 
Lan, Y., Yan, H., Ren, D., & R. Guo. (2019). Merger strategies in a supply chain with 
asymmetric capital-constrained retailers upon market power dependent trade credit. 
Omega 83, 299–318. 
Lee, Y.W., & Stowe, J.D. (1993). Product risk, asymmetric information, and trade credit. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 28(2): 285–300. 
Li, Q., Li, B., Chen, P., & Hou, P. (2017). Dual-channel supply chain decisions under 
asymmetric information with a risk-averse retailer. Annals of Operations Research 257(1–
2), 423–447. 
Ma, P., Zhang, C., Hong, X.P., & Xu, H. (2018). Pricing decisions for substitutable products 
with green manufacturing in a competitive supply chain. Journal of Cleaner Production 
183(5): 618–640. 
Mishra, B.K., & Raghunathan, S. (2004). Retailer- vs. vendor-managed inventory and brand 
competition. Management Science 50(4): 445–457. 
Mukhopadhyay, S.K., Yue, X., & Zhu, X. (2011). A Stackelberg model of pricing of 
complementary goods under information asymmetry. International Journal of Production 
Economics 134(2): 424–433. 
Ng, C.K., Smith, J.K., & Smith, R.L. (1999). Evidence on the determinants of credit terms 
used in interfirm trade. The Journal of Finance 54(3): 1109–1129. 
Petersen, M.A., & Rajan, R.G. (1997). Trade credit: Theories and evidence. Review of 
Financial Studies 10(3): 661–691. 
Peura, H., Yang, S.A., & Lai, G. (2015). Risk or margin: The role of trade credit in 
competition. SSRN: http://ssrn. com/abstract. Vol. 2571493. 
Rajan, R.G., & Zingales, L. (1998). Financial dependence and growth. The American 
 
 
Economic Review 88(3): 559–586. 
Schwartz, R.A. (1974). An economic model of trade credit. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 9(4): 643–657. 
Shavandi, H., Valizadeh Khaki, S., & Khedmati, M. (2015). Parallel importation and price 
competition in a duopoly supply chain. International Journal of Production Research 
53(10), 3104–3119. 
Taleizadeh, A.A., & Charmchi, M. (2015). Optimal advertising and pricing decisions for 
complementary products. Journal of Industrial Engineering International 11(1): 1–7. 
Tsay, A.A., & Agrawal, N. (2000). Channel dynamics under price and service competition. 
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2(4): 372–391. 
Venkatesh, R. , & Kamakura, W. . (2003). Optimal bundling and pricing under a monopoly: 
contrasting complements and substitutes from independently valued products. Journal of 
Business, 76(2), 211–231. 
Wei, J., Zhao, J., & Li, Y. (2013). Pricing decisions for complementary products with firms’ 
different market powers. European Journal of Operational Research 224(3): 507–519. 
Wei, J., Zhao, J., & Li, Y. (2014). Price and warranty period decisions for complementary 
products with horizontal firms’ cooperation/noncooperation strategies. Journal of Cleaner 
Production 105: 86–102. 
Wu, C.H., Chen, C.W., & Hsieh, C.C. (2012). Competitive pricing decisions in a two-echelon 
supply chain with horizontal and vertical competition. International Journal of 
Production Economics 135(1): 265–274. 
Wu, C., Zhao, Q., & Xi, M. (2017). A retailer-supplier supply chain model with trade credit 
default risk in a supplier-Stackelberg game. Computers & Industrial Engineering 112: 
568–575. 
Yan, R., & Bandyopadhyay, S. (2011). The profit benefits of bundle pricing of complementary 
products. Journal of Retailing & Consumer Services 18(4): 355–361. 
Yue, X., Mukhopadhyay, S.K., & Zhu, X. (2006). A Bertrand model of pricing of 
complementary goods under information asymmetry. Journal of Business Research 59(10): 
1182–1192. 
Zhang, T., & Wang, X. (2018). The impact of fairness concern on the three-party supply chain 
coordination. Industrial Marketing Management 73: 99–115. 
Zhao, J., Wei, J., & Li, Y. (2016). Pricing decisions of complementary products in a two-level 
fuzzy supply chain. International Journal of Production Research 56(5):1882–1903. 
Zhong, Y.G., & Zhou, Y.W. (2013). Improving the supply chain’s performance through trade 
credit under inventory-dependent demand and limited storage capacity. International 
Journal of Production Economics 143(2): 364–370. 
Zhu, J., Boyaci, T., & Ray, S. (2016). Effects of upstream and downstream mergers on supply 
chain profitability. European Journal of Operational Research 249(1): 131–143. 
 
 
